Up to date as of November 21, 2026. This article draws on the European roadmap of June 2025, on the NIST standards and on ANSSI’s publications. It will be updated as recommendations evolve.
TLS connections, VPNs, electronic signatures, certificates: much of digital security relies on public-key cryptography (RSA, elliptic curves). A sufficiently powerful quantum computer could break it. Nobody can say when one will exist; but for some data, the risk starts today.
Why act before quantum computers arrive
An attacker can intercept and store encrypted data right now, and decrypt it the day they have a quantum computer. Data that must remain confidential for a long time (trade secrets, health data, strategic information) is therefore already exposed.
The European roadmap draws a simple rule from this: a use case is high-risk if a breach of confidentiality ten years or more from now would still cause significant damage. The data concerned must be protected against quantum attacks by the end of 2030 at the latest.
Changing cryptography takes time: you need to know where it is, wait for suppliers to update it, replace equipment whose lifetime is measured in years. Hence the value of starting early.
The European timeline
On April 11, 2024, the European Commission published a recommendation calling for a coordinated transition. On June 23, 2025, the Member States, meeting in the NIS Cooperation Group, adopted a roadmap with three milestones:
- December 31, 2026: all Member States have taken the first steps, established a national roadmap and launched planning and pilot projects for high- and medium-risk use cases;
- December 31, 2030: the transition is completed for high-risk use cases;
- December 31, 2035: it is completed for medium-risk use cases.
The “first steps” are not just for governments. The roadmap details them, and most apply to every organization: involve the right people, inventory cryptography, map dependencies, include the quantum threat in the risk analysis presented to management, engage with suppliers and set a timeline. It describes the inventory as a “no-regret” move, useful whatever happens, and recommends a standardized format: the CBOM (Cryptographic Bill of Materials), an extension of the SBOM.
In France, the plan to strengthen cybersecurity presented by the government on November 19, 2026 includes support for post-quantum encryption solutions.
The standards are ready
On August 13, 2024, the US NIST published the first three post-quantum cryptography standards:
- FIPS 203 (ML-KEM), for key establishment;
- FIPS 204 (ML-DSA) and FIPS 205 (SLH-DSA), for electronic signatures.
On March 11, 2025, it selected a fifth algorithm, HQC, as a backup for key establishment. The building blocks exist; the challenge now is to integrate them into protocols, products and systems.
ANSSI’s position: hybridization
During the transition, ANSSI recommends hybridization: combining a proven classical mechanism with a post-quantum one. Security is then never lower than today’s, even if one of the two mechanisms were to be weakened. The European roadmap also recommends standardized and tested hybrid solutions wherever possible.
In its January 2024 opinion, ANSSI brought its timeline forward: the first security visas for products implementing hybrid post-quantum cryptography were expected around 2024-2025. On February 2, 2026, it published three technical sheets on the post-quantum transition of TLS 1.3, SSHv2 and IPsec. For TLS 1.3, the hybrid key exchange combines an elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman exchange with ML-KEM.
The link with NIS2
Article 21 of NIS2 requires policies and procedures on the use of cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption. The European roadmap asks Member States to encourage entities subject to NIS2 to include the quantum threat in their top-level risk management (see our analysis NIS2 in France).
Where to start
- Inventory your cryptography: algorithms, protocols, certificates, keys, libraries and equipment, on premises and in the cloud.
- Identify data with a long confidentiality lifetime (ten years or more) and the systems that will still be running after 2030: these are the priorities.
- Map dependencies: applications, PKI, hardware security modules (HSMs), VPNs, suppliers and cloud services.
- Include the quantum threat in the risk analysis presented to management.
- Ask your suppliers about their post-quantum timeline and require the ability to change algorithms (“crypto-agility”) in new purchases.
- Run a hybrid pilot on a limited scope, for example the TLS 1.3 key exchange or a VPN, following ANSSI’s technical sheets.
- Set a timeline consistent with the 2030 deadline for high-risk use cases.
Sources
- European Commission, EU reinforces its cybersecurity with post-quantum cryptography, June 23, 2025
- NIS Cooperation Group, A Coordinated Implementation Roadmap for the Transition to Post-Quantum Cryptography, June 2025
- NIST, release of the first three post-quantum standards, August 13, 2024
- NIST, selection of HQC, March 11, 2025
- ANSSI, opinion on the migration to post-quantum cryptography, January 2024 (in French)
- ANSSI, post-quantum transition of TLS 1.3, technical sheet, February 2026 (in French)
- ANSSI, post-quantum transition of IPsec, technical sheet, February 2026 (in French)
- French government, plan to strengthen cybersecurity, November 19, 2026 (in French)
- Directive (EU) 2022/2555 (NIS2), EUR-Lex
